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THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR. By Wi//iam V. O'Brien. 
New York: Praeger Publishers. 1981. Pp. vii, 495. $39.95. 
In an age of increasing world tension and sporadic outbreaks of interna-
tional violence, William V. O'Brien's The Conduct of Just and Limited War 
is a timely reappraisal of war. O'Brien fills a void in just-war literature, 
summarizing modem just-war and limited-war theories and applying them 
to analyses of the Korean and Vietnam wars. 1 Additionally, O'Brien sug-
gests ways in which theory can be transformed into policy initiatives to 
shape the dimensions of future wars. 
O'Brien opens his inquiry by suggesting that any realistic analysis of 
war must conclude that "recourse to armed coercion is a perennial feature 
of the human condition" (p. 2).2 He views war as the continuation of poli-
tics by other means and seeks to .fiud ways to limit and contain it (p. 3).3 He 
then moves beyond the abundant literature on the subject4 and brings to-
gether the separate theories of just war and limited war to show their com-
plementary nature. 
O'Brien asserts that "the single, underlying requirement for the conduct 
of just war is that such war must be limited" (p. 38). These interrelated 
1. Modem just-war theoreticians have focused primarily on World War II and the atomic 
bomb. 
2. By logical extension, O'Brien says, any approach that would simply "wish away" war is 
irrelevant. P.2. 
3. The only alternative view, O'Brien suggests, is to view war as inherently uncontrollable 
and subject only to total victory or defeat. 
4. For further analysis of the just-war theory, see generally S. BAILEY, PROHIBITIONS AND 
RESTRAINTS IN WAR (1972); R. BAINTON, CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR AND PEACE 
(1960); J. DOUGHERTY & R. PFALTZGRAFF, JR., CONTENDING THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 150-54, 167-71 (1971); J. EPPSTEIN, THE CATHOLIC TRADITION OF THE LAW OF 
NATIONS (1935); J. JOHNSON, IDEOLOGY, REASON AND THE LIMITATION OF WAR (1975); J, 
JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR: A MORAL AND HISTORICAL 
INQUIRY (1981); H. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER 
AND PEACE (3d ed. 1960); J. MURRAY, MORALITY AND MODERN WAR (1959); W. O'BRIEN, 
NUCLEAR WAR, DETERRENCE AND MORALITY (1967); R. POTTER, THE MORAL LOGIC OF 
WAR (n.d.); P. RAMSEY, WAR AND CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE: How SHALL MODERN WAR BE 
CONDUCTED JUSTLY? (1961); P. RAMSEY, THE JUST WAR: FORCE AND POLITICAL RESPONSI-
BILITY (1968); Walters, Historical Application of the Just War Theory: Four Case ,Studies in 
Normative Ethics in LOVE AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN THE ETHICS OF PAUL RAMSEY (J, John-
son & D. Smith eds. 1974); Childress,Just-War Criteria, in WAR OR PEACE: THE SEARCH FOR 
NEW ANSWERS 40 (T. Shannon ed. 1980); Hartigan, Noncombatant lmmunil):· Reflections on 
its Origins and Present Status, 29 REV. OF PoL. 204 (1967); Hehir, The Just-War Et/lie and 
Catholic Theology: .Dynamics of Change and Continuity, in WAR OR PEACE: THE SEARCH FOR 
NEW ANSWERS 15 (T. Shannon ed. 1980). For further analysis of the limited-war doctrine, see 
generally B. BRODIE, STRATEGY IN THE MISSILE AGE (1959); s. DEJTCHMAN, LIMITED WAR 
AND AMERICAN DEFENSE POLICY (1964); H. KISSINGER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN 
POLICY (1957); R. MCCLINTOCK, THE MEANING OF LIMITED WAR (1967); R. OSGOOD, LIM· 
ITED WAR (1957); R. OSGOOD, LIMITED WAR REVISITED (1979); R. OSGOOD & R. TUCKER, 
FORCE, ORDER, AND JUSTICE (1967); Garnett, Limited "Conventional" War in the Nuclear Age, 
in RESTRAINTS ON WAR: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATION OF ARMED CONFLICT (M, Howard ed. 
1979). 
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concepts, he says, can provide both bases for analysis of past wars, and 
goals for future wars (p. 71). 
The analysis begins by tracing the roots of just-war doctrine from its 
origins in the work of St. Thomas Aquinas and natural law5 to twentieth-
century philosophers and positive law.6 It is here that just-war doctrine has 
its primary roots (pp. 4-5). O'Brien acknowledges a third source, Christian 
theology, but contends that the church's just-war doctrine is primarily natu-
ral law, albeit natural law of a special kind (p. 15).7 
Having identified the roots of just-war theory, O'Brien divides his anal-
ysis into two parts: permissible recourse to war, and just conduct in war. In 
this accomplishment O'Brien's book is particularly useful. 
The first inquiry, whether a nation has permissible recourse to war, de-
pends upon three elements. Recourse to war is permissible when an au-
thority competent to wage war on behalf of the entire nation exists within it, 
5. For analysis of the influence of theology on war, see generally AQUINAS: SELECTED 
POLITICAL WRITINGS (A. D'Entreves ed. 1948); R. BAINTON, supra note 4; J. BENNETT, FOR-
EIGN POLICY IN CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE (1966); C. COOPER, THE LosT CRUSADE (1970); E. 
DE V ATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW APPLIED TO THE 
CONDUCT AND TO THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS (1916); J. EPPSTEIN, supra 
note 4; L. McREAVY, PEACE AND WAR IN CATHOLIC DOCTRINE (1963); PATTERN FOR PEACE: 
CATHOLIC STATEMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL ORDER (H. Flannery ed. 1962); R. NIEBUHR, 
CHRISTIANITY AND POWER POLITICS (1940); H. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW: A STUDY lN 
LEGAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY (1947); J. To01rn, THE JUST WAR IN AQUINAS 
AND GROTIUS (1965); L. WALTERS, FIVE CLASSIC JUST WAR THEORIES: A STUDY IN THE 
THOUGHT OF THOMAS AQUINAS, VITORIA, SUAREZ, GENTILI, AND GROTIUS (1971) (unpub-
lished dissertation Yale University). 
6. See, e,g., Charter of the Organization of American States, T.I.A.S. No. 2361 (1948); 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 
U.N.T.S. 222 (1955); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 
U.N.T.S. 31 (1950); Geneva Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production 
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 
Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time ofWar, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 57, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 
287 (1950); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (1950); Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted by the Conference June 8, 1977, UN Doc. A/32/144, 16 
I.L.M. 1391 (1977); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 
adopted by the Conference June 8, 1977, UN Doc. A/32/144 (1977), 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977); 
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and 
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94 
L.N.T.S. 65 (1929); Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539; Treaty for the Renunciation of War, Aug. 27, 1928, 
46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (1929). 
7. The teachings of Christ, O'Brien suggests, are primarily addressed to coli.duct of the 
individual. They are, therefore, not directly applicable to war between nations. P. 15. Fur-
ther, O'Brien says that theological thought is difficult to separate from the other elements of 
the theories of St. Thomas and the Scholastics. P. 15. He concludes that Scholastic just-war 
thought should be viewed as natural law "elevated" by ''the perspectives of Christians benefit-
ing from Christ's teaching[s)." As support, he cites theological acceptance of Scholastic teach-
ings on just war. P. 15. 
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when the nation has "just cause,"8 and when the nation possesses "right 
intentions"9 (pp. 16-36). Of the three requirements for permissible recourse 
to war, 'just cause" is the most difficult to define because it involves sub-
stantive evaluation of a nation's claim of right. In general, O'Brien says, a 
cause is just if a country's fundamental values or way of life are endangered 
(p. 21).10 
The second requirement of just war, just conduct in war, requires using 
only military force proportionate to political objectives and avoiding inten-
tional attacks on noncombatants and nonmilitary targets (pp. 38-55). Al-
though one or more of these specific elements may be more important than 
the others, they form a comprehensive whole (pp. 35-36). 
O'Brien then moves beyond familiar policies of military necessity and 
minimum destruction 11 and applies his criteria to contemporary examples. 
After illustrating the concepts of the just-war model through case analysis 
of World War II, and the Korean and Vietnam wars, he concludes that all 
three wars properly met just-war criteria (p. 331 ). 
In light of the political limits of O'Brien's case analysis, one wonders 
whether his American viewpoint partially distorts his vision. Analysis of 
the wars is objective and detailed; but, the conclusions do not always logi-
cally follow. For example, O'Brien notes that "[g]iven the dispute over the 
U.S. compliance with [permissible recourse to war] conditions, satisfactory 
compliance with the ijust conduct] requirements becomes essential if the 
United States is to be judged to have engaged in a just war in Vietnam" (p. 
98) and concludes that the just conduct record is "sufficiently good to qual-
ify for just-war status if the [permissible recourse to war] conditions are 
adequately met" (p. 125). With this somewhat circular reasoning, O'Brien 
concludes that the Vietnam war was a just war (p. 331 ). Another inconsis-
tency in the case analysis is O'Brien's treatment of World War II. He 
claims in theory that, "[t]he single, underlying requirement for the conduct 
of just war is that such a war must be limited" (p. 38), but finds in practice 
"that the total-war efforts against Germany and Japan met the just war 
conditions sufficiently to qualify these wars as just." (p. 87). This is consis-
tent provided political objectives measure the parameters of permissible vi-
olence, but one may then well wonder how such a standard really 
constrains the military conduct of powers totally dedicated to the purposes 
of their warmaking. 
In addition to analyzing conventional war in terms of just-war doctrine, 
O'Brien also undertakes the ambitious goal of making sense of the threat of 
nuclear war. In perhaps the most controversial of his theories, O'Brien sug-
8. The means of pursuing this just cause must be proportionate to the right asserted, p.16. 
See note 10 infra. 
9. Right intention means simply that the motivation for war is limited to the vindication of 
the right that is the basis of the just cause, pp. 33-34. 
10. Readers interested in assessing the merits of particular claims of ''.jusP cause" may be 
disappointed in O'Brien's treatment of it. For the most part, just-cause examples in his book 
are of attempts on the part of the U.S. to preserve democratic values in the face of fascist or 
communist encroachment, such as World War II, p. 72, and the Korean and Vietnam Wars, 
pp. 87, 91. 
11. See, e.g., M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC OR-
DER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 520-31 (1961), 
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gests that under certain conditions, a limited exchange of nuclear weapons 
can meet just-war criteria (p. 129). O'Brien, a self-professed realist, grap-
ples with moral inconsistencies and notes that the nuclear deterrent pro-
vides a source of stability and peace in the world, but is itself beyond any 
possible justification (p. 341). Realizing that the deterrent may one day fail, 
O'Brien examines limited nuclear attack as an option which may poten-
tially limit the havoc wreaked on humanity. 
O'Brien also examines the limited-war concept itself. The value of the 
limited-war concept is its utility in formulating a goal of proportionality 
between good and evil resulting from the war (p. 225). O'Brien successfully 
blends the various theories into unified guidelines on limited war. 12 His 
admittedly inexhaustive guidelines suggest such measures as maintaining 
political control over military means, limiting objectives and applying 
means proportionate to the objectives, imposing voluntary rules of conduct, 
developing flexible responses, and avoiding escalation (pp. 222-23). Focus-
ing on the need to develop flexible responses, O'Brien says that the United 
States has an immediate moral duty to develop a range of alternative re-
sponses which enable it to counter aggression ranging from minor conven-
tional skirmishes to all-out nuclear war (pp. 354-56). In concluding this 
prescriptive section, the author adds that the restrictions of just and limited 
war must be self-imposed, regardless of the behavior of others (pp. 330-31). 
The Conduct of Just and Limited War raises many uncomfortable issues. 
It addresses the collective and individual consciences of society and its 
members and urges questions that must be asked about war. O'Brien's 
book reinforces the view that war, an inevitable political resort, can and 
must be dealt with in moral terms if the destructive capability of modem 
warfare is to be controlled. Through thoughtful implementation of limited-
war guidelines, nations may be less likely to conduct unjust wars (p. 348). 13 
What the author cannot entirely dispel is the dreadful risk that formalizing 
the logic which justifies the use of modem weapons may reinforce the de-
mands for war - never considered dispassionately and deliberately, even 
by the best of leaders - with an impressive but superficial analytic rigor. 
One ventures the guess that very few people have died in wars believed to 
be unjust by those responsible for them. 
12. The principal works on the subject are those of Osgood, Kissinger, Brodie, Halperin, 
and Deitchman, supra note 4. 
13. The book is copiously documented and includes an extensive bibliography. 
